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1. Conception1
This paper will spotlight civic rights. It will presuppose that they cluster around 
them are number of  other such protections pertaining to voting, association, 
expression, non-discrimination, and so forth. The discussion will posit them as 
serving to consolidate the citizenry and as supplying it with a potential source for a 
post-national principled identity.
In unified Europe, the guaranties at stake come across as problematic perhaps 
because of  their relative newness, their perception as a work in progress, and the 
verbal violence against their institutions of  origin. They have, therefore, generated 
meager awareness, let alone support, among leaders or citizens. Solving these 
deficiencies might simultaneously help address others.
Concretely, the European Union should undertake a two-fold strategy not 
only to shore up such entitlements but also to ensure its own survival against the 
deadly threat of  ethno-nationalism. In particular, it should: (1) propel a participatory 
procedure to constitutionalise and to transform how it views itself; and (2) enhance 
social welfare rights for the benefit of the immense majority of its citizens. These 
initiatives would inevitably have to take place over an extended period of time and 
against all odds. That notwithstanding, they appear to offer the Continent its only 
chance of  overcoming its long-standing crises and resisting its ethnic nationalist 
temptations.
2. Background
While organizing a 2017 symposium entitled, A Continent Divided: Nationalism 
and the European Union as faculty advisor to the Connecticut Journal of  International 
Law,2 the editors reviewed the available learned production. They noticed that even 
though the media had amply covered this novel topic, serious punditry on point had 
only commenced.3 Consequently, the periodical invited top scholars, who initiated 
a still on-going intellectual conversation, which should prospectively persist on a 
global scale and which the current inquest purports to reorient.
The referenced event centered on the perils posed by: (1) the U.K exit on Europe’s 
northwestern frontier; (2) the debt debacle in the Eurozone, principally, along the 
southern fringe; and (3) the weakness of  the rule of  law in the east. Furthermore, 
it evoked wider issues, which mostly relate to the nationalistic tendencies evident, 
as well as divergent, throughout. The papers submitted traversed this vast topical 
terrain, which the present study will itself  explore.4
1 The author himself  has translated the quoted non-English texts and vouches for the accuracy of  the 
translation. He would like to thank Claudia Schubert for her invaluable contribution to the development 
of  the ideas of  this paper.
2 See Symposium, “A Continent Divided: Nationalism and the European Union”, Conn. J. Int’l L., 
vol. 32 (2017): 309 [hereinafter Symposium]. See also Federico Fabbrini, “Constitutional Crisis and 
Institutional Reform: The European Union at the Crossroad”, Conn. J. Int’l L., vol. 32 (2017): 285; 
Jeffrey Atik, “The Social Experience of  the Euro”, Conn. J. Int’l L., vol. 32, (2017): 267.
3 Cf. Jill I. Goldenziel, “The Curse of  the Nation-State: Refugees, Migration, and Security in 
International Law”, Ariz. ST.  L. J.,  vol. 48 (2016): 579; Christopher K. Connolly, “Independence in 
Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union”, Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L., vol. 24 (2013): 51; 
Moria Paz, “The Failed Promise of  Language Rights: A Critique of  the International Language Rights 
Regime”, Harv. Int’l L. J., vol. 54 (2013): 157.
4 See generally Symposium, supra note 1.
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(1) New York University’s Grainne de Búrca wrote about the so-called “Brexit” 
as a choice stemming from the longstanding “difficult” relations between: (a) the 
United Kingdom; and (b) the European Union and reflected on  various potential 
explanations for the vote. Frank Emmert of  Indiana University, in turn, mused about 
the future of  these two entities, externalizing plenty of  pessimism. My colleague 
Peter Lindseth then decoded the U.K departure as a backlash against Europe’s 
Court of  Justice. Finally, Wesleyan Professor Peter Rutland dove into an alternate 
decodification of  the referendum’s result as a shocking but explicable reaction to the 
perceived dreadful ramifications of  European integration: loss of  sovereignty, mass 
migration, and growing domestic economic inequality.5
(2) From the University of  Leiden, Tanja Bender reported that the recession 
in Europe led to further fiscal competition among member countries to attract 
businesses and ultimately, to taxpayer protests against (entirely legal) tax-avoidance 
by multinationals. As a positive upshot, she pinpointed the emergence of  a politically 
hardened will to harmonize corporate taxation regionally. Jeffery Atik of  Loyola Law 
School in Los Angeles, for his part, gauged the euro’s social cost against its capacity 
to coalesce the citizenry. Dublin City University’s Federico Fabbrini maintained 
that the crisis swelled due to the absence of  a powerful Brussels-based executive, 
which might have tackled the institutionally determined dimension and fostered a 
systemic upgrade. Closing out, Georgetown’s Philomila Tsoukala argued essentially 
that the bloc furnished money to Greece’s administration not to subsidize Greeks 
living beyond their means but to save the continentally spread-out banking-network. 
She rejected the suggestion of  pumping up the executive authority, while speaking 
favorably of  a multispeed Europe.6
(3) Boston College’s Vlad Perju juxtaposed jurisdictions in which the effort to 
undermine legality structures succeeded (like Hungary or Poland) against those in 
which it flopped (such as Romania). He attributed the difference in outcomes to the 
local leadership’s conduct rather than to the European Union’s external intervention. 
Thereafter, Rutgers’s Roger Daniel Kelemen detailed Europe’s mechanisms for the 
preservation of  democracy and human rights. Wrapping up, Daniel Hegedus of  
the German Council on Foreign Relations, as well as Visiting Lecturer at the Free 
University of  Berlin, dissected the Hungarian regime’s democratic backsliding and 
falling-out with the bloc.7
These three dialogic exchanges are progressing fascinatingly and have proffered 
invaluable insights.8 Nonetheless, they are flowing somewhat separately from one 
another. The upcoming disquisition will seek to weave all the threads together. It 
will aspire to portray each of  these critical emergencies as pointing to, inter alia, a 
single problem: namely, the lack of  a potent across-the-board civic identity, through 
which citizens might feel that they can at once, uphold and profit from the cooperative 
scheme in place. This deficiency would seem to account, to some degree, for the 
British balloting to bolt, the reluctance of  well-off  northerners to support worse-off  
southerners, and the illiberal impulses on the Eastern front.
At a more abstract level with quite tangible repercussions, the reflections 
formulated will summon up a critique of  the extant literature via the framework outlined 
5 See generally id.
6 See generally id. See also Fabbrini, supra note 1; Atik, supra note 1.
7 See generally Symposium, supra note 1.
8 See id.
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ahead. Indeed, they will envision construing European communities transnationally 
and nationally through constitutionalized precepts, rather than nationalistically through 
values or slogans. The ensuing integrative setup across Europe should achieve an 
augmented legitimisation and functionalisation.
3. Argument
“A specter is haunting Europe: the specter of”9 nationalism”, to paraphrase Karl Marx. 
The United States confronts a similar threat, perhaps more extremely.10 On both coasts 
of  the North Atlantic, partisans pushing an ethnically nationalistic agenda have gained 
prominence and, all too often, power.11 Apparently, they have drawn on their vision 
of  the nation to delineate their populism politics, which deeply divides the populace 
through nativism and xenophobia. Upon accomplishing my proposal, I will conclude 
that the European Union needs to reinforce its constitutional democracy and solidarity 
and to rely on them to ignite in its citizens a stronger allegiance to it, in conjunction 
with an unprecedented sense of  identity.
In a nutshell, the European Union should embark upon two existential journeys 
in the face of  its contemporary malaise and the underlying ethno-nationalist menace. 
It should: (1) launch a bottom-up popular dialogue in order radically to alter how it 
understands itself, with a focus on the civic rights it constitutionally recognizes; and (2) 
beef  up its own solidarity-inspired engagement, as well as that of  its population. These 
twin endeavours would inevitably have to take place protractedly and improbably. 
Nonetheless, they may, very well, constitute the sole hope of  keeping the flame alive.
The troubles and challenges facing the European Union conjure the famous 
proclamation of  Antonio Gramsci: “The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying 
and that the new cannot be born. In this interregnum, a wild array of  morbid phenomena appears.”12 In 
my opinion and counterintuitively enough, ethnic nationalism not the bloc, represents 
the aging life-form that is painfully progressing toward death. Simultaneously, an 
unprecedented collective self-understanding is struggling, apparently hopelessly, to 
come to birth.
Loosely defined, an ethno-nationalist movement identifies or associates the polity 
with a peculiar, mostly dreamt up,13 ethnic group or perspective. It excludes outsiders 
9 Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei, 4 Werke (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
1983), 461 (“Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa — das Gespenst des Kommunismus.”) (“A specter is 
haunting Europe: the specter of  Communism.”).
10 Liz Alderman, “Macron Vowed to Be Business Friendly. Now He Faces a Protectionist Uproar”, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2017 (“President Trump is championing a more nationalistic stance in the United 
States, while Europe is generally calling for freer trade to stoke growth.”).
11 Patrick Boehler, “Catalonia, Ukraine, Turkey: Your Thursday Briefing; Europe Edition”, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 26, 2017 (“In the United States, President Trump’s brand of  hard-edge nationalism is 
increasingly taking root within the Republican Party. Those uneasy with grievance politics are either 
giving in or giving up the fight”); Katrin Bennhold, “Merkel Forges Pact to Govern With Old Allies”, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2018 (“Nationalist leaders in Central and Eastern Europe, led by Hungary’s prime 
minister, Viktor Orban, are challenging the liberal consensus at the heart of  the European bloc.”); 
Steven Erlanger, “Macron Urges E.U. to Uphold The ‘Authority of  Democracy”, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 
2018 (“And nationalism in Europe is on the rise, and not just in Central Europe, under pressure from 
migration, terrorism and globalization.”).
12 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni dal carcere (Turim: Giulio Einaudi, 1977), 311 (Q 3, § 34) (“La crisi 
consiste appunto nel fatto che il vecchio muore e il nuovo non può nascere: in questo interregno si 
verificano i fenomeni morbosi più svariati.”).
13 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London/New York: Verso, 2006), 5-6 (“In an 
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and other standpoints as alien. Needless to say the instigating insiders act illegitimately, 
as well as arbitrarily, not merely in their concoction of  an identity along these lines but 
especially, in their exclusion of  others.
Ethno-nationalism is a worn-out, tired concept. It has been perishing for over two 
centuries. At least since the French Revolution, societal actors in Europe and beyond 
have been attempting to imagine the integration of  politicised collectivities through 
principles, rather than ethnicities.14 Nevertheless, they have clung to the ethnically 
nationalistic paradigm, despite its conceptual and moral bankruptcy, because of  its 
apparent capacity to bring the masses together simply and quickly. This simplicity and 
quickness of  appeal explains, in addition to its staying power up to now, why it will not 
inevitably disappear soon, or ever.
Nationalism, according to Jürgen Habermas, “emerges within the educated middle-
class and spreads out through the channels of  modern mass-communication.”15 “It takes on artificial 
features,” he elucidates, “…due to both its literary development and its wide public dissemination.”16 
“Its constructed character renders it intrinsically susceptible to manipulative misuse at the hands of  
political elites.”17 In light of  this manipulability, politicians frequently feel tempted to 
proceed nationalistically in order to reach and remain in office.
The principled alternative, which harks back to the Enlightenment or earlier,18 
presents itself  nowadays under the formulation of  “constitutional patriotism,” popularized 
anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of  the nation: it is an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”).
14 See, e.g., Declaration of  the Rights of  Man and Citizen of  1789, appended to Const. (Fr.) (“Les 
Représentants du Peuple Français... ont résolu d’exposer, dans une Déclaration solennelle, les 
droits naturels, inaliénables et sacrés de l’Homme, (...) afin que les réclamations des Citoyens, 
fondées désormais sur des principes simples et incontestables, tournent toujours au maintien de la 
Constitution et au bonheur de tous.”) (“The representatives of  the French people... have decided 
to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of  man, (...) so that 
the citizens’ grievances, hereafter based upon these simple and incontestable principles, will tend to 
uphold the constitution and to enhance the happiness of  all.); Const. (Bol.), pmbl. (Construiremos 
“[u]n Estado basado en el respeto e igualdad entre todos, con principios de soberanía, dignidad, 
complementariedad, solidaridad, armonía y equidad en la distribución y redistribución del producto 
social, donde predomine la búsqueda del vivir bien; con respeto a la pluralidad económica, social, 
jurídica, política y cultural de los habitantes de esta tierra.”) (We shall construct “[a] state not only 
based on the notions of  respect and equality for all, along with principles of  sovereignty, dignity, 
complementarity, solidarity, harmony, and of  equity in the distribution and redistribution of  the social 
product, but also in which the quest for good living prevails and respectful of  the economic, social, 
legal, political, and cultural plurality among the inhabitants of  theses lands.”).
15 Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des Demokratischen 
Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 635 (“Er ersteht im gebildeten bürgerlichen Publikum und 
verbreitet sich über die Kanäle der modernen Massenkommunikation.”) [hereinafter, Habermas, FG].
16 Id. (“Beides, die literarische Vermittlung und die publizistische Ausbreitung, verleiht dem 
Nationalismus künstliche Züge...”).
17 Id. (“... das gewissermaßen Konstruierte macht ihn von Haus aus für den manipulativen Mißbrauch 
durch politischen Eliten anfällig.”).
18 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten (Frankfurt: Wilhelm Weischedel ed., Suhrkamp 
1977), 429 (Part II, Ch. I, § 43) (Das öffentliches Recht “ist also ein System von Gesetzen für ein 
Volk, d.i. eine Menge von Menschen, oder für eine Menge von Völkern, die, im wechselseitigen gegen 
einander stehend, des rechtlichen Zustandes unter einem sie vereinigenden Willen, einer Verfassung 
(constitutio) bedürfen, um dessen, Rechtens ist, teilhaftig zu werden.”) (Public law “is a system of  
laws for a people, that is, a multitude of  persons or peoples who relate to each other reciprocally, as 
well as legally, under a will that unites them all. They therefore need a constitution (constitutio) to partake 
in what is right.”).
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by Habermas himself,19 originally coined by Dolf  Sternberger,20 and espoused in 
some form within and without European borders.21 It finds an echo in philosophical 
conceptions developed in the United States, such as the “political liberalism,” “overlapping 
consensus,” or “public reason” of  John Rawls.22 Those who assume this outlook recommend 
integrating communities socially and politically through a set of  constitutionalised 
norms, which usually embody specific basic entitlements, rather than through a shared 
cultural or linguistic background.23
At times, Europe’s elected establishment seems to have marched down this 
path. It has proposed charters or their equivalents and has, with limited success, 
urged its constituents to follow its lead.24 Not surprisingly, ethno-national forces 
have resurfaced and resisted at every turn.25
19 See Habermas, FG, supra note 14, at 651 (“Verfassungspatriotismus”) (“constitutional patriotism”); 
Jürgen Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur Politischen Theorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1996) 143, 263-264 (“Verfassungspatriotismus”) (“constitutional patriotism”).
20 Dieter Henrich attributes the term “constitutional patriotism” (“Verfassungspatriotismus”) to Dolf  
Sternberger. Dieter Henrich, Nach dem Ende der Teilung: Über Identitäten und Intellektualität in Deutschland 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993), 74.
21 See, e.g., Francesc de Carreras, “Patriotismo sin tribu”, El país, Nov. 11, 2001 (“Frente a un concepto 
prepolítico y prejurídico de patria basado en un pasado histórico compartido con la voluntad de 
constituir una comunidad de destino, el patriotismo constitucional propugna una identidad colectiva 
basada en los valores de libertad e igualdad, de Estado de derecho y de democracia.”) (“Against a pre-
political and pre-legal concept of  fatherland resting on a shared historical past and on a will to constitute 
a community of  destiny, constitutional patriotism advocates a collective identity based on the values 
of  liberty, equality, the rule of  law, and democracy.”); Guillermo Hoyos Vásquez, “Multiculturalismo y 
democracia en América Latina”, Congreso latinoamericano sobre filosofía y democracia, eds. Humberto Giannini 
and Patricia Bonzi (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 1997), 289, 302-303 (“La democracia deja de 
ser mero procedimiento, y como campo de participación desde perspectivas culturales diferentes logra 
que los ciudadanos se reconozcan como miembros de una comunidad y que dichas comunidades se 
relacionen entre sí: es la dimensión ética del patriotismo constitucional.”) (“Democracy ceases to reduce 
to a mere procedure. As a field of  participation from different cultural perspectives, it brings citizens to 
recognize themselves as members of  a community and these collectivities to interrelate with each other. 
This represents the ethical dimension of  constitutional patriotism.”).
22 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Now York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 135 (“(...) political 
liberalism supposes that there are many reasonable comprehensive doctrines with their conception 
of  the good, each compatible with the full rationality of  human persons (…).”); John Rawls, “The 
Domain of  the Political and Overlapping Consensus”, N.Y.U. L. Rev., vol. 64 (1993): 233, 234 (“[T]
he idea of  an overlapping consensus is introduced to explain how, given the plurality of  conflicting 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines always found in a democratic society—
the kind of  society that justice as fairness itself  enjoins—free institutions may gain the allegiance 
needed to endure over time.”); John Rawls, “The Idea of  Public Reason Revisited”, U. Chi. L. Rev., 
vol. 64 (1997): 765, 773 (“A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she deliberates within 
a framework of  what he or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of  
justice, a conception that expresses political values that others, as free and equal citizens might also 
reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse.”).
23 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, “Irish to Vote on Complex European Union Treaty, Raising Fears of  Its 
Rejection”, N.Y. Times, June 12, 2008 (“In 2005, a proposed European constitution—written under 
the aegis of  Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the former French president—died after it was rejected by 
voters in France and the Netherlands.”).
25 Craig S. Smith, “Sensing Opportunity, Rightist Seeks the French Presidency Again”, N.Y. Times, May 2, 
2006 (“But recent opinion surveys indicate that [France’s aging right-wing firebrand, Jean-Marie] Le Pen’s 
approval rating has surged to more than 20 percent after government missteps over a draft European 
constitution a year ago, rioting last fall in immigrant neighborhoods, largely by second-generation 
residents, and a labor law that drew nationwide protests last month.”); Richard Bernstein, “Charter for 
the European Union Meets Resistance”, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2005 (“Anticonstitution campaigners, like 
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In part, this constitutional campaign has made scant progress because its 
proponents have not embraced it openly or clearly. Mostly, however, it has foundered 
because it has unfolded on a top-down basis. The whole effort has failed to mobilise, 
let alone fire up, the citizenry.26
The European Union would need to venture two steps to improve its prospects 
in this quest. First, it would have to set in motion a protracted, profound, deliberative, 
and democratic process. Thereby, its denizens would ponder, discuss, draft, and 
eventually approve a constitution. In the end, they would attain a new constitutional 
self-definition on their own and deliberately, not by observing the mandate or 
recommendation of  their representatives or upon a leap of  faith. Secondly, the bloc 
would have to focus incrementally on social-welfare guaranties. It would then have 
a better shot at convincing its constituencies of  the concrete advantages of  the 
advocated transformation.
Transitioning to this vantage point on both counts would not only enhance the 
legitimacy of  Europe’s institutional organs. It would also increase their functionality. 
The entire entity would operate more legitimately by intensifying its commitment 
to democracy and distributive justice. Currently, it appeals based on, at best, the 
boon of  a massive, merged market and a lasting peaceful coexistence or, at worst, a: 
“chauvinism of  affluence,”27 which comes across as oppressive against the impoverished 
periphery and exterior. The European Union would additionally turn into a more 
functional enterprise, with members permanently committed to the good of  all. It 
presently tends to function as an arrangement of  convenience. Individual countries 
pursue, almost exclusively, their own self-interest. Great Britain appears to provide 
an extreme case in point, all the way up to its dramatic decision to depart.28 This 
generalised stance renders it practically impossible to build anything in the long run.
Evidently, not even the statesmen and women most devoted to the communal 
project have fully grasped its civic implications. When Germany’s Chancellor 
Angela Merkel traveled to France after a moment of  terror and tragedy in 2015, 
for example, she justified her presence in terms of  friendship, while deploying 
the formal, comfortably distancing, German pronoun “Ihnen.”29 In the aftermath 
of  a populist electoral scare in the Netherlands in 2017, she spoke of  partnership 
too.30 These manners of  addressing neighbors engaged in a joint undertaking of  
Geert Wilders, a maverick populist member of  Parliament and a leading anti-immigration campaigner, 
have toured the country to warn that the Dutch will lose control of  their own borders.”).
26 See, e.g., Marlise Simons, “Dutch Voters Solidly Reject New European Constitution”, N.Y. Times, 
June 2, 2005 (“But most noted by analysts after the results became known was the enormous gap 
between politicians and common citizens.”).
27 Habermas, FG, supra note 14, at 659 (“Wohlstandschauvinismus”).
28 See, e.g., Stephen Castle, “Britain Receives Proposals for ´Better Deal` to Stay in the E.U.”, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 3, 2016 (“Mr. Cameron has said that he wants to negotiate a ‘better deal’ from the bloc... Mr. 
Cameron called the new plan a ‘very strong and powerful package,’ adding that, while there was no final 
agreement and more work was needed, ‘strong, determined and patient negotiation has achieved a good 
outcome for Britain.’’’) (quoting former Prime Minister David Cameron).
29 Addressing the French people after the Parisian terrorist attack on November 14, 2015, Merkel 
proclaimed: “Wir, die deutschen Freunde, wir fühlen uns Ihnen so nah.” (“We, your German friends, 
we feel so close to you.”). Thorsten Denkler, “Merkel: ´Wir weinen mit Ihnen`”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Nov. 14, 2015 (on file with the author) (quoting Angela Merkel). See also Adam Nossiter, Aurelien 
Breeden, and Katrin Bennhold, “Paris Attack Was the Work of  3 Teams”, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 2015 
(“‘We, your German friends, we are so close with you.’”) (quoting Angela Merkel).
30 See Angela Merkel, “Speech at the Demography Summit in Berlin”, Chancellorship Documents, Mar. 16, 
2017, (on file with the author) (“Die Niederlande sind unser Partner, unser Freund, unser Nachbar.”) 
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transnational consolidation over six decades sound somewhat tepid. to say the least. 
Non-European nations with much looser ties to the Continent, such as the United 
States, can already refer to their European counterparts as “friends” or “partners.”31 
Merkel could have instead used the expression “fellow citizens.”
In actuality, a common citizenship binds the peoples of  this consolidated 
Europe,32 generally entailing “the right to move and reside freely within the territory,” “to 
vote and to stand as [as a candidate] in [European and municipal] elections,” and “to petition 
. . . European . . . institutions.”33 Granted, it is evolving sluggishly and still has a 
considerable way to go, above all, in the sense of  encompassing a robust notion 
of  anti-discrimination, along with a vigorously enforced set of  entitlements (and 
duties), such as those guaranteed (and imposed) by Europe’s Charter of  Fundamental 
Rights.34 On solidarity, specifically, not to mention other progressive or emancipatory 
aspirations, this otherwise ambitious unification venture has little to show for itself. 
Surprisingly, sometimes, the Central European Bank seems to be moving faster 
and farther on this front than the other bodies or the national governments and 
populaces.35
In sum, Europe should dare the recommended two-fold strategy to ensure 
its own survival. In other words, it should: (1) propel a participatory procedure to 
(“The Netherlands is our partner, our friend, our neighbor.”).
31 Mark Landler and Thom Shanker, “Gates and Clinton Unite to Defend Libya Intervention, and Say 
It May Last Awhile”, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2011 (“our European friends”) (quoting Hillary Clinton); 
Liz Moyer, “U.S. and Europe Set Rules for Derivatives Regulation”, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2016 (“our 
European partners”) (quoting former U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew).
32 See Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  the European Union, 13 December 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
391. Cf. European Court of  Justice (Grand Chamber), Nov. 14, 2017, Toufik Lounes v. Secretary of  State 
for the Home Department, In Case C-165/16, paragr. 51 (Nationals of  Member States possess “rights 
pertaining to Union citizenship, (...) also against (...) Member States.”).
33 Treaty of  Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of  Lisbon], art.º 20(2).
34 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253, art.º 
8(1) (“Citizenship of  the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of  a Member 
State shall be a citizen of  the Union.”); Treaty of  Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, 
the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 
O.J. (C 340) 1, 37 I.L.M. 253, art.º 8(1) (“Citizenship of  the Union is hereby established. Every person 
holding the nationality of  a Member State shall be a citizen of  the Union. Citizenship of  the Union shall 
complement and not replace national citizenship.”); Treaty of  Lisbon, art.º 20(1) (same).
35 Compare Jack Ewing and Liz Alderman, “Inaction by Greeks Tests Patience of  Rescuers from the 
Central Bank”, N.Y. Times, May 7, 2015 (“The European Central Bank has already lent about 110 
billion euros, or about $120 billion, to banks in Greece—more than to any other country’s financial 
institutions, relative to the size of  the economy. The banks need the cash to continue providing 
credit to the Greek economy.”) with Stephen Castle, “When Britain Goes to Vote, European 
Union May Feel the Results”, N.Y. Times, May 7, 2015 (“Mr. Cameron has spoken of  restricting 
welfare payments for Europeans who can come to Britain because the bloc guarantees the citizens 
of  member states free movement across European borders.”). See also Jürgen Habermas, “Warum 
Merkels Griechenland-Politik ein Fehler ist”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 22, 2015 (on file with the author) 
(“Mit der Ankündigung, notfalls Staatsanleihen in unbegrenzter Höhe anzukaufen, hatte er für die 
Euro-Gruppe die Kastanien aus dem Feuer geholt. Er mußte vorpreschen, weil die Regierungschefs 
unfähig waren, im europäischen Gemeininteresse zu handeln; sie blieben ihren jeweils nationalen 
Interessen verhaftet und verharrten in Schockstarre.”) (“By announcing the purchase, if  necessary, of  
an unlimited number of  governmental bonds, [Mario Draghi, the head of  the European Central Bank,] 
pulled the chestnuts out of  the fire for the Eurogroup. He had to press ahead on his own because the 
heads of  government were unable to act in the common European interest. They remained trapped 
in their respective national interests and stuck in a state of  paralysis.”).
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constitutionalise and to transform how it views itself; and (2) enhance social welfare 
entitlements for the benefit of  the majority of  its inhabitants. Obviously, these 
initiatives would have to come to fruition over an extended period of  time and against 
all odds. Notwithstanding, they appear to offer the only chance of  overcoming the 
Continent’s long-standing critical predicament and defeating ethnic nationalism, 
along with the morbidity that it propagates.
